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Abstract
We examine the problem of setting optimal incentives for a portfolio manager hired by an investor who wants to
induce ambiguity-robust portfolio choices with respect to estimation errors in expected returns. Adopting a worst-case
max−min approach we obtain the optimal compensation in various cases where the investor and the manager, adopt
or relinquish an ambiguity averse attitude. We also provide examples of applications to real market data.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to provide a model for
the study of a problem of delegated portfolio management
when there is uncertainty on the estimates of the expected
returns of the assets in the investment set and the agents
are averse to such an ambiguity.
We are interested in analyzing the effects of ambiguity
aversion in portfolio choices and managerial fees. To this
end we assume that a portfolio manager with an exponen-
tial utility function is hired by an investor who pays him
a fee on the final wealth produced by the selected port-
folio strategy. The manager accepts the contract under
the condition that his compensation is at least as large
as a minimum level that he sets based on his minimum
acceptable level of utility.
This kind of problem is studied within the theory of Del-
egated Portfolio Management where the optimal form of a
contract between investors and managers is investigated.
The seminal paper of this theory is due to Bhattacharya
and Pfleiderer (1985) [1]. A nice review of the main contri-
butions can be found in Stracca (2006) [2]. For more recent
references see also Fabretti and Herzel (2012) [3]. Our ap-
proach integrates an important line of research in robust
portfolio selection; see e.g., [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]
and references therein. Instead of assuming a probabil-
ity distribution and formulating a stochastic optimization
problem, Robust Optimization (RO) confines data un-
certainties into an uncertainty set, and follows a worst-
case approach which takes full responsibility for all oc-
currences of data within the uncertainty set, an approach
akin to the min-max approach of robust control. Suit-
able uncertainty sets (ellipsoidal, polyhedral) are justified
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according to the problem context, and RO methodology
proceeds by transforming the min-max problem into a
“tractable” (that can be processed by available efficient
algorithms) optimization problem. In the context of port-
folio selection, it is well-known that distribution of ex-
pected returns is not known precisely, and that portfo-
lio composition is particularly sensitive to expected return
data [14, 15, 16, 17]. Several authors in the references
[18, 5, 6, 7, 19, 9, 10, 11, 12, 20, 13] addressed this prob-
lem by applying robust optimization techniques to variants
of the portfolio selection problems.
In general, past contributions on robust portfolio selec-
tion, with the exception of Garlappi et al (2007) [11], rely
on numerical solution of optimization problems, whereas in
this paper we obtain a closed-form robust portfolio selec-
tion rule. We consider a one period economy with n risky
assets following a multivariate return distribution and a
risk-less asset. In this world there is an investor who is
averse to estimation error in the expected return estimates
of the risky assets (we call this ambiguity aversion). The
investor, unable (or unwilling) to undertake the investment
directly by herself, wants to hire a portfolio manager. She
offers a contract which is a linear function of the final (ran-
dom) wealth, and faces the problem of selecting a suitable
fee to be paid to the manager (by maximizing ambiguity
robust expected final wealth after paying off the manager),
which should be sufficiently high to attract the manager.
The manager accepts the contract provided that his utility
reservation constraint is satisfied. The main objective of
our study is to formulate a model that is simple enough to
get explicit results but also sufficiently structured to ad-
dress important issues such as the impact of the investor’s
ambiguity aversion. This impact is measurable from the
explicit formulae we obtain.
Wer an application of our results to an example with
real market data, determining the sharing rules for differ-
ent cases of investment strategies with a constraint based
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on socially responsible rules. This example is interesting
because we can compare two opposite effects due to the
restriction of the investment set, the first one negative,
because of the ruled out investment opportunities, the sec-
ond one positive, because more socially responsible firms
may be, according to some professionals and academics
[21], more “transparent” and hence more desirable for an
ambiguity averse decision maker. For details, the reader
is referred to the extended version of our paper [22].
2. Portfolio strategies under ambiguity aversion
Here we consider the problem of an Ambiguity Averse
(AA) agent with a Constant Absolute Risk Averse
(CARA) utility with risk aversion α, e.g. a negative expo-
nential utility function. The agent maximizes his utility
trading in one risk-less asset with return R ≥ 1 and in n
risky assets with return vector X which follows a Gaussian
law with mean X¯ and positive definite variance-covariance
matrix Σ.
We model ambiguity as uncertainty in the mean of the
return vector X. We assume that an AA agent is uncertain
about the true mean X¯, but assumes that it belongs to the
set
U
()
Xˆ
= {Y ∈ Rn| (Y − Xˆ)TΣ−1(Y − Xˆ) ≤ 2}, (1)
that is an n-dimensional ellipsoid centered at Xˆ (the es-
timated mean) with radius , which we call the “level of
ambiguity aversion”. The idea is that the decisions of an
AA agent are taken by considering the worst case occur-
rences of the true mean X¯ within the set U
()
Xˆ
. Therefore,
more conservative choices are taken when the set is larger,
i.e. for greater values of , while an “Ambiguity Neutral”
agent who does not have any doubt about errors in the
estimated values sets  equal to zero and assumes that the
estimated mean Xˆ is equal to the true mean X¯. The differ-
ences between the true mean X¯ and its forecast Xˆ depend
on the variance of the returns, hence they are scaled by
the inverse of the covariance matrix. The random variable
(X¯−Xˆ)TΣ−1(X¯−Xˆ) has a well known distribution (under
standard assumptions on the returns), and this fact, as we
will see in Section 5, can be exploited to set the values for
 in order to get the desired likelihood for the true mean
to belong to the set U
()
Xˆ
.
Let us define the vector of estimated excess expected
returns µˆ = Xˆ − R1 where 1 is a n-vector of ones and
the quantity Hˆ =
√
µˆTΣ−1µˆ. It is well known that Hˆ is
the maximal Sharpe Ratio obtainable in a market model
with parameters Σ and µˆ. Note that it depends on the
estimated value of the expected excess return which may
be different from the unknown real value. An AA investor
who believes that the real expected return X¯ belongs to
the ellipsoid U
()
Xˆ
solves the problem
max
ω
min
X¯∈U()
Xˆ
(X¯−R1)Tω√
ωTΣω
where ω is the n-dimensional portfolio vector (i.e. ωi rep-
resents the money invested in the i− th risky asset). After
solving the inner problem, the optimization becomes
max
ω
(Xˆ−R1)Tω − 
√
ωTΣω√
ωTΣω
= Hˆ − . (2)
Hence we can define the “ambiguity averse” Sharpe Ra-
tio, with level of ambiguity aversion , as Hˆ = Hˆ − .
Therefore Hˆ is the maximal Sharpe Ratio according to
an AA investor. Note that it is always smaller than the
Sharpe Ratio Hˆ based on the estimated values and that it
may also be negative. A negative Hˆ means that the AA
investor will refrain from investing in the risky assets.
Let W0 be the initial wealth to be invested, then the
AA agent with CARA utility with risk-aversion α selects
a portfolio ω by solving the problem
max
ω
min
X¯∈U()
Xˆ
E
[
−e−α(ωT (X−R1)+W0R)
]
(3)
where X ∼ N(X¯,Σ). The following proposition shows
that (3) has a closed form solution.
Proposition 1. Let returns X be normally distributed
with mean X¯ and variance Σ. An AA agent with a CARA
utility with risk-aversion α and ambiguity set U
()
Xˆ
selects
the same portfolio strategy as an agent who is ambiguity
neutral but is risk-averse with a coefficient of risk-aversion
αˆ = α
Hˆ
Hˆ
, provided that Hˆ > 0. When Hˆ ≤ 0 the
AA agent is equivalent to an agent with an infinite risk-
aversion.
Proof: An agent who is neutral with respect to ambigu-
ity assumes that the true mean X¯ is equal to the estimated
mean Xˆ and selects the optimal strategy solving the prob-
lem
max
ω
E
[
−e−α(ωT (X−R1)+W0R)
]
, (4)
where X ∼ N(X¯,Σ). The solution of (4) is
ω¯ =
1
α
Σ−1
(
X¯−R1) = 1
α
Σ−1µˆ, (5)
where the last equality follows from the assumption of neu-
trality with respect to ambiguity.
We prove that the optimal portfolio strategy for problem
(3) is
ωˆ =
{
1
α
(
Hˆ
Hˆ
)
Σ−1µˆ if Hˆ > 0
0 if Hˆ ≤ 0
(6)
Then the result follows immediately from comparing the
two solutions (5) and (6).
To obtain (6) we start by computing the expectation in
(3) and reformulating the problem as
max
ω
min
X¯∈U()
Xˆ
− exp
(
−αX¯−R1Tω + α
2
2
ωTΣω − αW0R
)
.
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Taking the logarithm and solving the inner minimization
problem (see Garlappi et al. [11]) we get
max
ω
µˆTω − α
2
ωTΣω − 
√
ωTΣω.
Under the hypothesis that the problem admits a solution
ωˆ different from zero, first-order conditions (note that the
objective is a concave function of ω)
µˆ− αΣω −  Σω√
ωTΣω
= 0,
are both necessary and sufficient. Straightforward compu-
tations than lead to (6).
The previous result states that increasing the level of
ambiguity aversion leads to an increase in the risk aversion.
More precisely, the parameter of risk aversion increases
by a factor that is proportional to the ratio between the
estimated Sharpe ratio Hˆ and the AA Sharpe ratio Hˆ.
When the uncertainty on the estimate is so high that Hˆ
is not positive, the agent does not assume any position
in the risky assets and put all his wealth into the risk-free
investment, i.e. he behaves as if his risk aversion is infinite.
3. Delegated portfolio management under ambigu-
ity aversion
Now we consider the problem of an investor who wishes
to delegate the management of her wealth to a portfo-
lio manager. We assume that the investor is risk-neutral,
while the portfolio manager has a CARA utility with risk-
aversion α. Both the investor and the manager may also
be averse to ambiguity.
The investor allocates a capital W0 to the portfolio man-
ager with the mandate to form a portfolio with the assets
available in the market, including the risk free asset. At
the end of the period, the investor will compensate the
manager with a fraction b of the final value of the portfo-
lio, keeping the rest for herself. Hence an Ambiguity Neu-
tral manager with risk aversion coefficient α determines
the optimal portfolio allocation by solving
max
ω
E
[
−e−αb(ωT (X−R1)+W0R)
]
, (7)
where X ∼ N(Xˆ,Σ). We also assume that the manager
sets a minimum level b0 for the fraction of the final value of
the portfolio to accept the contract and a maximum level
that is equal to 1. The choice of b0 will be discussed in
detail in Section 4. Therefore, the problem of the investor
is to choose the best value for the compensation factor b
according to her utility, by keeping in mind that the value
of b also affects the portfolio strategy of the manager.
From Proposition 1 it follows that an AA manager is
equivalent, in terms of portfolio choices, to an Ambiguity
Neutral manager with an adjusted risk-aversion. For this
reason, we can consider, as a general case, the problem of
an AA investor who hires an Ambiguity Neutral manager
with risk aversion α, that is
max
b0≤b≤1
min
X¯∈U(δ)
Xˆ
E
[
(1− b)(ωˆT (X−R1) +W0R)
]
(8)
where X ∼ N(X¯,Σ) and the allocation ωˆ is chosen by the
manager solving (7), that is
ωˆ =
1
αb
Σ−1µˆ. (9)
Proposition 2. The optimal compensation factor for an
AA investor with ambiguity set U
(δ)
Xˆ
dealing with a man-
ager with CARA utility with risk-aversion α is
b∗ =

b0 if δ ≤ Hˆ(√
Hˆ(δ−Hˆ)
αW0R
)
[b0,1]
if δ > Hˆ
(10)
where (·)[b0,1] represents projection onto the interval [b0, 1].
Proof: We consider first the minimum in (8), that is
a convex optimization problem satisfying Slater condi-
tion, therefore optimality conditions are both necessary
and sufficient. The Lagrangian function is L(X¯, λ) =
ωˆT (X¯ − 1R) + W0R − λ(δ2 − (X¯ − Xˆ)TΣ−1(X¯ − Xˆ)),
and first order conditions with respect to X¯ admits the
solution X¯∗ = Xˆ − 12λΣωˆ which gives L(X¯∗, λ) = ωˆT µˆ +
W0R − 14λ ωˆTΣωˆ − λδ2. Differentiating and solving for λ
gives λ∗ =
√
ωˆTΣωˆ
2δ , which transforms the problem (8) into
max
b
(1− b)
(
ωˆT µˆ+W0R− δ
√
ωˆTΣωˆ
)
.
Substituting the optimal allocation ωˆ given by (9) we ob-
tain maxb (1 − b)
(
W0R+
Hˆ(Hˆ−δ)
αb
)
. The objective func-
tion is convex for Hˆ ≥ δ and concave for Hˆ < δ. Its first
derivative is −W0R − Hˆ(Hˆ−δ)α b2 which is always negative if
Hˆ ≥ δ, while it admits the root
√
Hˆ(δ−Hˆ)
αW0R
if δ > Hˆ.
Proposition 2 shows that if δ ≤ Hˆ, the investor assigns
to the manager the minimum possible share that is suffi-
cient to hire him, because a smaller share keeps the man-
ager greedy and ready to assume riskier positions, which
is adequate for the risk-neutral investor. If δ > Hˆ the
investor is so pessimistic about the quality of the mean
return estimates that she would rather stay away from the
risky assets. In this case increasing b has, for the investor,
both positive and negative effects. Positive because it in-
duces the manager to be more risk-averse, negative be-
cause it decreases the investor’s wealth. The value of b∗
for the case δ > Hˆ finds the balance between these two
effects. The projection onto the interval [b0, 1] is due to
the constraint imposed to the original problem.
We remark that, as shown by Proposition 1, when the
ambiguity aversion δ is greater than Hˆ, the optimal choice
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for a risk-neutral (and also for a risk-averse) investor would
be to refrain from investing into risky assets.
The case of an AA portfolio manager is obtained as a
corollary of the previous result. The notation Hˆδ is defined
analogously to Hˆ.
Corollary 1. The optimal compensation factor for an AA
investor with ambiguity set U
(δ)
Xˆ
dealing with a CARA util-
ity manager with risk-aversion α and ambiguity set U
()
Xˆ
is
b∗ =

(√
(Hˆ)(−Hˆδ)
αW0R
)
[b0,1]
if Hˆ > 0 and Hˆδ < 0
b0 o.w.
Proof: It is sufficient to use Proposition 1 and substitute
αˆ for α into (10).
When the manager is strongly diffident about the esti-
mates (i.e. his AA Sharpe ratio is negative), he will invest
all the wealth in the risk-free asset, independently from
the incentives received by the investor, therefore the best
strategy for the investor is to set the compensation to the
minimum level b0 set by the participation constraint. In-
deed, the quantity b0 plays a key role in this problem and
in the next section we will see how it can be determined.
To focus our analysis on the effects of ambiguity aversion
we assumed that the investor is risk-neutral. In the case
of a risk averse investor all formulas become more com-
plicated, but it is still possible to show that the optimal
sharing factor is increasing with the risk aversion of the
investor and decreasing with the risk aversion of the man-
ager. This is due to the fact that increasing the sharing
factor increases the manager’s risk aversion and therefore
the investor uses it to align the manager’s attitude towards
risk with her own.
4. Setting the participation constraint
We assumed that the AA manager accepts the contract
only if the investor offers a share of the final wealth greater
than a minimum level b0 chosen by the manager. The
choice of b0 depends on a minimum level of utility U¯ that
the manager expects to receive after signing the contract.
The relation between b0 and U¯ is given by
max
ω
min
X¯∈U()
Xˆ
E[−e−αb0(ωT (X−R1)+W0R)] = U¯ , (11)
where X ∼ N(X¯,Σ). We know that the optimal strat-
egy selected by the manager is ωˆ = 1Hˆ>0
(
Hˆ
αb0Hˆ
)
Σ−1µˆ,
where 1A the characteristic function of the set A, and that
(11) is equivalent to −αb0
(
ωˆT µˆ+W0R− 
√
ωˆTΣωˆ
)
+
(αb0)
2
2 ωˆ
TΣωˆ = log(−U¯). After some substitutions we ob-
tain
b0 =
1
αW0R
(
− log(−U¯)− 1
2
Hˆ2 1Hˆ>0
)
. (12)
This formula shows that the minimal sharing factor b0 in-
creases with the required level of utility U¯ and decreases
with the Ambiguity Adjusted Sharpe Ratio Hˆ. When
Hˆ is positive, the portfolio manager is willing to invest
in risky assets, and hence he reduces the sharing factor
required to achieve the level of utility U¯ .
To determine U¯ the manager should compute the util-
ity that he may obtain from other competing job offers.
As a general case we consider a manager who has the
opportunity to work for another investor who offers the
same amount of money W0 to be invested in a set of as-
sets, we denote by ρ the level of ambiguity aversion of
the manager and by H¯ρ the ambiguity adjusted Sharpe
Ratio on the alternative investment set. Assuming that
the alternative contract provides a sharing factor b¯0, we
can easily compute the utility achieved by the manager
on the alternative contract, that is the reservation util-
ity U¯ = −e−αb¯0W0R−
H¯2ρ
2 1H¯ρ>0 . Substituting into (12) we
determine the equation of the sharing factors
b0 = b¯0 +
1
2αW0R
[
H¯2ρ1H¯ρ>0 − Hˆ2 1Hˆ>0
]
. (13)
The sharing factor b0 increases with the Ambiguity Ad-
justed slope of the capital market line in the alternative in-
vestment set, and decreases with the Ambiguity Adjusted
slope of the capital market line in the actual investment
set. Therefore there may be cases where, because of the
relative difference in the levels of ambiguity, the manager
is willing to decrease the level of the sharing factor. An
interesting special case is when the alternative investment
set has the same Sharpe ratio as the proposed one but
without uncertainty on the estimates of the expected re-
turns (i.e. H¯ρ = Hˆ). In such a case the difference between
b0 and b¯0 may be interpreted as a “premium for ambigu-
ity”, as it represents the extra compensation required by
the manager when two investment sets differ only by the
uncertainty on the expected returns.
5. An application
As an example of application of our results to real mar-
ket data, we consider an investment mandate subject to
some restrictions imposed by the investor. In particular,
we study investment restrictions due to principles related
to Social Responsibility (and to its contrary). We want
to analyze how the ambiguity aversions of an investor and
and of a portfolio manager affect their optimal sharing
factor. As a proxy for the choice of a socially responsible
investment strategy we chose the FTSE KLD Social Index
(henceforth KLD index).
We choose the Vice Fund as a proxy for ”non-socially-
responsible” investments. The Vice Fund invests in com-
panies engaged in the aerospace and defence industries,
owners and operators, gaming facilities as well as manu-
facturers of gaming equipment, manufactures of tobacco
4
products and producers of alcoholic beverages. We re-
mark that there is no intersection between the investment
sets considered by the two strategies. The proxy for the
risk free assets is the one-month Treasury bill. We are
equipped with three time series spanning the period from
September 2002 to September 2012.
For each month t we computed the sample mean Xˆt
and variance Σt of the monthly excess returns of the two
indices on a moving window consisting of the previous
T = 36 months. From these quantities, applying for-
mula (2), we computed the ex-ante optimal Sharpe ratios
of three investment strategies: the first one, called the
“conventional” strategy, that combines the risk-free asset
with the two indexes, the second one, called the “green”
strategy, which excludes the Vice index and the “black”
strategy, which excludes the KLD index.
Figure 1 represents the optimal Sharpe ratios of the
three strategies. As expected, because of the benefits of
diversification, the Sharpe ratio of the conventional strat-
egy is always above the other two. For most of the period
considered, the Sharpe ratio of the black strategy is higher
than that of the green one. The only two sub-periods when
the Sharpe ratio of the green strategy was higher were be-
tween the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, and be-
tween March and October 2011. Note also that the only
period where the “conventional” strategy significantly out-
performed both the black and the green strategy is from
August 2009 to June 2011.
Figure 1: Expected Sharpe ratios for the “conventional”, the “black”
and the “green” strategies. The straight lines represent the toler-
ances to ambiguity for n = 2 (the conventional case) and n = 1 (the
other cases) at a probability level p = 0.7. When the Sharpe ratio is
below the corresponding tolerance line, an ambiguity averse investor
should invest only in the risk-free asset.
To address the issue of ambiguity in the estimates of the
expected returns on n assets with a sample of length T , we
use a well known result due to Hotelling (see Johnson and
Wichern (1997) [23], page 212), which states that under
standard assumptions on the time series of the returns,
when Σ is the sample covariance matrix, X¯ the exact mean
and Xˆ the sample mean, the random variable
Z =
T (T − n)
(T − 1)n (X¯− Xˆ)
TΣ−1(X¯− Xˆ) (14)
has an F-distribution with n and T − n degrees of free-
dom. Therefore, the level of ambiguity aversion  can be
obtained as a quantile of Z corresponding to a given prob-
ability level p of a sample mean falling inside the ellipsoid.
The higher the aversion to ambiguity, the higher the value
of p. In our example, we set p = 70%, obtaining the val-
ues 2 = 0.267 for n = 2 and 1 = 0.175 for n = 1. The
two constant lines in Figure 1 correspond to these val-
ues. Note that the green and the black strategies have the
same level of ambiguity , because such a quantity only
depends on p and n. We remark that the value of  is
subjective as it depends on the level p of confidence of the
agent in the statistical estimates (and on the parameters
n and T ). According to some studies (see e.g. [21] and
the references therein), estimates on Socially Responsible
stocks are more trustworthy, because Social Responsibil-
ity involves a more transparent management. An agent
who adopts this view may assign lower values to the level
of ambiguity aversion of Socially Responsible stocks. Here
we take a neutral point of view setting the level of ambigu-
ity aversion determined by the distribution of the random
variable Z.
The analysis of Section 3 determines the optimal sharing
factor b as a function of market conditions, risk and ambi-
guity aversions, total wealth and the minimum acceptable
fee. To study the effects of the investor’s aversion to am-
biguity on the compensation, we consider a conventional
investment strategy with a portfolio manager who is neu-
tral towards ambiguity. To determine a reference level for
the factor αW0 appearing in (10) we assume that the man-
ager would choose a portfolio composed only by the risky
assets if he had to decide where to invest W0 on his own
account. This assumption implies that 1T ωˆ = W0, there-
fore, using formula (5) for the optimal portfolio ωˆ, we get
αW0 = 1
TΣ−1µˆ. (15)
We also set the minimum compensation level at b0 = 1%.
Figure 2 shows the optimal factor b for two levels of ambi-
guity aversion of the investor, corresponding to confidence
levels p = 10% and p = 70% corresponding, respectively,
to δ = 0.078 and δ = 0.267, obtained as quantiles of the
distribution (14). The investor uses the incentive to in-
crease the risk aversion of the manager when needed, that
is when the Sharpe ratio of the conventional strategy Hˆ
falls below the level δ of ambiguity aversion. For this rea-
son b∗ is increasing with the level of ambiguity aversion.
For lower levels of δ, like those corresponding to the con-
fidence p = 10%, there is hardly ever any necessity of in-
creasing the fee over the minimum requested by the man-
ager. When Hˆ is lower than δ, b∗ is above b0 and reaches
its maximum for Hˆ equal to δ/2. The times of the occur-
rences of the peaks observed in Figure 2 correspond to the
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months where Hˆ approaches the level δ/2 (see Figure 1),
while the peaks’ heights depend on the assumption on the
term αW0 given by (15).
Figure 2: Optimal sharing factor b∗ for two levels of ambiguity aver-
sion. The initial wealth W0 and manager’s risk aversion α are as-
sumed to satisfy (15). The minimum sharing factor is set to b0 = 1%
In Figure 3 we study the effects of the restrictions of the
investment set on managerial compensations, with or with-
out ambiguity, where we computed the minimal required
sharing factor for the different cases analyzed in Section
4. We consider as the alternative investment set always
the total universe of assets and represent the differences
be tween b0 and b¯0 in the following cases
1. Case 1. The investment is restricted to the green in-
vestment set. No ambiguity aversion.
2. Case 2. The investment is restricted to the black in-
vestment set. No ambiguity aversion.
3. Case 3. The investment is restricted to the green
investment set. With ambiguity aversion at level
2 = 0.267 for the total universe and 1 = 0.175 for
the restricted set (corresponding to a confidence level
p = 0.70).
4. Case 4. The investment is restricted to the black
investment set. With ambiguity aversion at level
2 = 0.267 for the total universe and 1 = 0.175 for
the restricted set.
The manager’s risk aversion is assumed to satisfy (15). We
compare case 1 to 3 and 2 to 4 if we want to observe the
effect of ambiguity, while we compare case 1 to 2 and 3 to
4 when we want to observe the differences between green
and black strategy and the effect of restriction. We note
that the premium for cases 1 and 2 are always greater
than or equal to zero, as expected, since they represent
the compensation for the restriction in the investment set
without ambiguity. The compensation for restricting to
green assets (case 1) is usually greater, because of the
higher expected Sharpe ratio of the black strategy, doc-
umented in Figure 1. When ambiguity aversion is taken
into account (cases 3 and 4), the premium becomes smaller
and sometimes it gets negative. Negative values mean that
an ambiguity averse manager prefers to invest in the re-
stricted set rather than in the larger one. This happens
when the level of ambiguity aversion is high with respect
to the expected Sharpe Ratio. Hence, a negative value rep-
resents a reduction that the manager is willing to apply on
the sharing factor. For a long period starting in January
2008 and going as far as September 2012, the values are
zeros or negative for both the black and the green strate-
gies, therefore an ambiguity averse manager would have
not asked for any extra compensation for restricting the
investment set. The cases 1, 3 and 2, 4 involve the same
kind of restriction, with or without Ambiguity Aversion.
Hence, by comparing 1 to 3 and 2 to 4 we can isolate the
effect of manager’s Ambiguity Aversion, observing that it
has the effect of diminishing his requests.
Figure 3: Changes in the minimum fee required for restricting the
investment set to set X, with or without ambiguity aversion. Case
1: X is the green set, no ambiguity aversion. Case 2: X is the
black set, no ambiguity aversion. Case 3: X is the green set, with
ambiguity aversion. Case 4: X is the black set, with ambiguity
aversion. The level of ambiguity aversion is obtained by setting a
likelihood p = 70% and the manager’s risk aversion from (15)
In summary, we observed that the aversion to ambiguity
on estimated expected returns has a negative effect on the
expected Sharpe Ratio of a strategy and, as shown by Fig-
ure 3, decreases the compensation required by a manager
to restrict the investment set. For most of the period ex-
amined the black strategy had a better Sharpe ratio, there-
fore the required compensation for managers investing in
it were generally lower than the one for the green strategy.
However, if a risk-neutral investor believes that expected
returns of green assets are easier to predict because of a
more transparent governance, as claimed by some advo-
cates of Corporate Social Responsibility (see e.g. [21]),
this would affect her own level of ambiguity aversion and,
as shown by Figure 2, decrease the compensation factor
for the portfolio manager.
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